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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Did the district court properly follow the weight of
authority in applying the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) retroactively and in
holding that the ten years of chemical dumping by
the Greater Uniontown Vocational School (GUVS)
falls within Congress's Commerce Clause
jurisdiction?
II. Did the district court properly interpret CERCLA's
liability provisions when it allowed While-U-
Wait Photo Service (WUWPS) to seek recovery
from GUVS for the costs of cleaning the site
that GUVS polluted, but held WUWPS liable for
the costs of a medical monitoring regime
independently administered by the State of New
Union Health Services Agency (SNUHSA)?
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To the Honorable United States Court of Appeals for
the Twelfth Circuit:
Plaintiff-appellee, While-U-Wait Photo Service
(WUWPS), respectfully submits this brief in support of its re-
quest that this Court reverse in part the decision of the
United States District Court for the District of New Union
and render judgment for WUWPS on both claims heard by
that court. Specifically, WUWPS requests that this Court re-
verse the decision allowing the State of New Union Health
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Services Agency (SNUHSA) to recover medical monitoring
costs from WUWPS and GUVS while affirming the remainder
of the district court's decision.
OPINION BELOW
In a decision entered April 23, 1996, the United States
District Court for the District of New Union held that the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA) applies to the photochemical
waste dumping at 123 Laurel Street, Uniontown, because the
dumping affected interstate commerce sufficiently to invoke
federal Commerce Clause jurisdiction and because CERCLA
may be applied retroactively. (R. at 8). The court also held
that While-U-Wait Photo Services (WUWPS) could seek re-
covery from the Greater Uniontown Vocational School
(GUVS) for site cleanup costs under either CERCLA 107 or
CERCLA 113. (R. at 9). Finally, the court held that CERCLA
107 allows the State of New Union Health Services Agency
(SNUHSA) to seek compensation from GUVS and WUWPS
for the medical monitoring program it set up for parties ex-
posed to the Laurel Street waste release. (R. at 9).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States Consti-
tution provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall have
the Power [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States."
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutory provisions are relevant and are
treated at length within the text of the brief: CERCLA
101(23), 101(24), 104(i), 107, and 113. The pertinent text is
set forth in full in an appendix attached hereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of Facts
The relevant facts are simple and undisputed:
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Elizabeth Andrews, the sole owner and operator of
While-U-Wait Photo Service (WUWPS) in Uniontown, New
Union, has never failed to take photo-processing chemicals
from her business to the New Union State Environmental
Protection Agency's "hazardous-waste collection days." (R. at
5,6). Working through WUWPS, she fronted the cost of
cleanup when she discovered that groundwater contamina-
tion at 123 Laurel Street was causing her neighbors discom-
fort. (R. at 6). Now, representatives for the Greater
Uniontown Vocational School (GUVS) believe that WUWPS
should absorb the expenses for the cleanup even though the
contamination was largely the result of GUVS's own dumping
when it previously owned the property from 1963 to 1973. (R.
at 4,5).
Although GUVS is a creation of the New Union Legisla-
ture, it is now an independent entity from the state govern-
ment. The Legislature incorporated GUVS by statute in
1963, and allocated $1 million for start-up costs. (R. at 3,4).
Since then, GUVS has never again sought funding from the
Legislature. (R. at 4). In fact, GUVS has received at least $3
million from the private sector. (R. at 5). Although the Legis-
lature appointed GUVS's initial board of directors, GUVS
thereafter has had complete control over appointments, sub-
ject only to the normal parameters applicable to any non-
profit business. (R. at 4). A 1964 opinion of the New Union
attorney general concluded that "GUVS is not an instrumen-
tality of the New Union state government." (R. at 4).
GUVS operated at the 123 Laurel Street location until
1973, during which time it dumped photographic-solution re-
fuse into a small ditch in the backyard. (R. at 4, 5). The raw
materials used to produce the chemicals and to manufacture
the equipment used in the GUVS's photography program
came from a nationwide market. (R. at 5).
On April 27, 1973, GUVS sold its real property at 123
Laurel Street and all its photographic equipment to Start-Up
Photography Studios (SUPS). (R. at 5). SUPS operated at the
site until April 23, 1979, continuing the dumping practices
first adopted by GUVS. (R. at 5).
9611997]
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On September 30, 1980, WUWPS bought the 123 Laurel
Street property from the bankrupt SUPS. (R. at 5). WUWPS
operates as a photo-processing business at the location and
draws all of its customers from Union County. (R. at 5).
Nothing in the sales contracts and deeds transferring the
123 Laurel Street property from GUVS to SUPS, and later to
WUWPS, says anything about hazardous-waste liability, but
Ms. Andrews knew about GUVS's and SUPS's disposal prac-
tices. (R. at 6).
In 1993, the Marina family, who occupy the house next
door, began to complain of a "camera-type" odor coming from
their water well. (R. at 6). Acting promptly on its own accord,
WUWPS paid $300 to have the Marinas' water tested. (R. at
6). The tests revealed elevated levels of photo-processing
chemicals in the water, and an engineering firm's report de-
termined that the ditch in the backyard of 123 Laurel Street
was the source of the chemicals. (R. at 6).
WUWPS again footed the bill in 1994, paying the engi-
neering firm $30,000 to investigate and remove contaminated
soil. (R. at 6). Because of these actions, there is no longer a
threat to human health or the environment from contami-
nated soil or water. (R. at 6). The parties stipulate that the
water testing and the work of the engineering firm were con-
ducted consistent with the National Contingency Plan. (R. at
6).
Having little money and no health insurance, the Mari-
nas requested that the State of New Union Health Services
Agency (SNUHSA), New Union's public health department,
examine each member of the family. (R. at 6, 7). In Septem-
ber of 1994, SNUHSA began a medical monitoring program
for the Marinas, examining each of the five minor children
and two adults every calendar quarter. (R. at 7). The cost of
continuing testing for adverse effects from the exposure is
$250 per person per quarter. (R. at 7). Although SNUHSA
has found no adverse effects, it expects to continue the testing
through December 2000. (R. at 7). The parties stipulate that
SNUHSA's actions are not inconsistent with the National
Contingency Plan. (R. at 7).
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Procedural History
WUWPS sued GUVS under the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA), seeking reimbursement for the costs of water testing,
site investigation and soil removal under CERCLA
107(a)(4)(B). (R. at 7). At the same time, SNUHSA sued
GUVS and WUWPS for medical monitoring costs under CER-
CLA 107(a)(4)(A). (R. at 7). These actions have been consoli-
dated. (R. at 7).
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the United
States District Court for the District of New Union ruled that
CERCLA applies to this case, that WUWPS may proceed
against GUVS under CERCLA 107 and that medical monitor-
ing costs are recoverable by SNUHSA from both GUVS and
WUWPS. (R. at 9).
WUWPS appeals the lower court's decision to allow
SNUHSA to recover medical monitoring costs from WUWPS.
(R. at 1). GUVS appeals on both the medical monitoring is-
sue and the lower court's decision to apply CERCLA to the
case at hand. (R. at 1).
Standard of Review
Review of a district court's grant of summary judgment is
de novo. Abuan v. General Electric Co., 3 F.3d 329, 331 (9th
Cir. 1993). It is the trial judge's function "to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Lib-
erty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1985). The circuit court
reviews facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party to find support for the lower court's factual determina-
tions. Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep't of the U.S. Army, 55
F.3d 827, 844 (3d Cir. 1995). The circuit court also looks to
see "whether the district court correctly applied the relevant
substantive law." FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744,
747 (9th Cir. 1992).
1997] 963
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
WUWPS urges this court to affirm the findings of the
court below with the exception of the ruling pertaining to lia-
bility for medical monitoring costs.
First, the district court properly found that Congress in-
tended for CERCLA to reach back and redress environmental
wrongs by imposing liability on the parties responsible for the
presence of hazardous waste. The district court also properly
ruled that the disposal of hazardous waste at any level is an
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce and
that CERCLA as applied to the contamination of 123 Laurel
Street is an appropriate exercise of congressional Commerce
Clause authority. By arguing to the contrary, GUVS opposes
every court that addresses these issues, save one, and contra-
dicts the plain language and legislative history of CERCLA.
Second, the court below correctly ruled that WUWPS is
entitled to bring an action to recover the cost of remediating
the Laurel Street property under either section 107 or 113 of
CERCLA. The plain language of 107 provides that GUVS, as
a potentially responsible party, is liable for response costs in-
curred by any other person. There is no qualifying language
that would render this provision inapplicable to the case at
hand.
However, the district court erred in finding that WUWPS
is liable to SNUHSA for medical monitoring costs. The medi-
cal monitoring regime that SNUHSA has recommended for
the Marina family lies within the realm of personal injury
treatment and prevention. Congress specifically left out re-
covery provisions for personal injury when it passed CER-
CLA, and interpreting the statute otherwise would cause
confusion of state and federal toxic waste laws. Even if the
medical monitoring costs fell within CERCLA's realm, how-
ever, SNUHSA still would not be able to recover for the moni-
toring because CERCLA sets up an elaborate system of
medical testing that excludes medical monitoring from its re-
covery provisions. For these reasons, WUWPS urges this
Court to overrule the district court and allow medical moni-
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/15
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toring costs to remain the province of the state health serv-
ices agency.
ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RULED
THAT RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF
CERCLA TO THE DUMPING OF
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES AT THE
LAUREL STREET SITE IS VALID UNDER THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THAT GUVS IS
LEGALLY LIABLE FOR THE COSTS OF
REMEDIATING THE SITE IT POLLUTED.
GUVS has conceded that it is a potentially responsible
party (PRP) under the CERCLA test for liability. 42 U.S.C.
§ 107(a) (1995). The only way for GUVS to escape responsi-
bility for remediating the property it contaminated is for it to
assert that the entire CERCLA statute was not meant to en-
compass its actions and that CERCLA, as applied to this
case, is not a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause
authority. To this end, GUVS not only contradicts the clearly
expressed intent of Congress, but relies upon a widely ques-
tioned decision as its only authority for these arguments.
A. Retroactivity is the key to CERCLA's effectiveness and
was clearly Congress' intent, as revealed by the
language and legislative history of the statute as
well as subsequent congressional reauthorization
and case law.
(i) The express language of CERCLA supports the
finding of the lower court that Congress intended
to impose retroactive liability.
CERCLA is couched in the past tense. The very title of
the statute indicates that Congress contemplated an act that
would authorize a cause of action for costs incurred in re-
sponse to environmental hazards. Presumably, Congress did
not intend for CERCLA to apply only to sites that were con-
taminated after the enactment of such legislation. It is im-
portant, when determining the reach of the statute, to
1997] 965
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remember the context in which it was adopted. CERCLA was
passed in direct response to notorious environmental disas-
ters of the 1970s involving inactive and abandoned sites, such
as Love Canal in upstate New York. S. Rep. No. 848, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., 8-10 (1980), reprinted in Superfund: A Legis-
lative History, (Envt'l L. Inst.) (1982) at Vol. 1, 315-17. As a
matter of common sense, the only way an inactive or aban-
doned site is going to be remediated is if a statute covers re-
leases that PRPs allowed to occur before enactment.
GUVS relies upon United States v. Olin, 927 F. Supp.
1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996), appeal docketed, No. 96-6645 (11th Cir.
July 10, 1996), in asserting that CERCLA was not meant to
apply retroactively. Olin in turn relies upon the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994), for the assertion that Congress has not
demonstrated a clear retroactive intent in the express or non-
express statutory language of CERCLA. Olin, 927 F. Supp. at
1512. In fact, CERCLA 107(a) expressly imposes liability on
"any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub-
stances owned or operated any facility. .. ." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(2) (1995)(emphasis added). The phrase "at the time
of disposal" is unambiguous and unlimited in temporal scope.
See United States v. NEPACCO, 810 F.2d 726, 732 (8th Cir.
1986).
(ii) CERCLA's legislative history also supports the
lower court's finding that Congress intended to
impose retroactive liability.
Once again, the context in which the statute was adopted
is important. Congress' plain intent in passing CERCLA was
to impose liability on all responsible parties, including those
whose involvement occurred prior to CERCLA's enactment.
To that end, liability under CERCLA has historically been
considered strict, joint and several, and retroactive. Adminis-
tration of the Federal Superfund Program, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess., Report of the Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight of the Committee on Public Works and Transporta-
tion 3 (1993). As both the EPA and Congress have stated, one
of the goals of CERCLA is to ensure that the polluter pays. S.
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Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 13 (1980). See also
Twenty New Reforms Cap 2-Year Effort to Reform Superfund,
EPA Administrator Calls for Legislative Changes, (U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency news release), 1995 WL 578216
(Oct. 2, 1995). Under the facts of this case, GUVS is certainly
a liable polluter.
Before enacting CERCLA, the House Committee on In-
terstate and Foreign Commerce commented upon the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the only
federal statute addressing toxic waste pollution enacted at
the time, expressing concern about the effect of discarded
hazardous wastes on the population and the environment.
H.R. Rep. No.1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4 (1976).
Four years later, Congress enacted CERCLA in order to
address the problem of abandoned and inactive waste sites
that the forward-looking provisions of RCRA did not reach.
What legislative history exists concerning the intended pur-
pose of CERCLA uniformly indicates that Congress clearly
intended to provide a solution to longstanding systemic and
widespread practices of hazardous waste dumping.
Moreover, in the House debate over CERCLA's
Superfund and liability provisions, Representative Jeffords
noted that rather than relying on the Fund alone to finance
remediation, the final bill "would establish liability rules to
govern payment into the fund by those persons responsible
for causing the release of hazardous waste, replenishing the
fund for future cleanup and resource compensation payments
to governments. 126 Cong. Rec. 31,978 (1980). In the Senate,
Senator Dole advocated the elimination of Fund authority to
borrow from the Treasury because the final compromise
"ought to provide a self-financing mechanism for hazardous
waste cleanup." 126 Cong. Rec. 30,950 (1980).
Congress clearly intended to impose liability for response
costs upon parties whose pre-enactment conduct caused envi-
ronmental harm. The District Court of New Union correctly
recognized that the remedial nature of CERCLA confers upon
WUWPS an opportunity to recover from the polluting parties.
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(iii) The lower court's finding of congressional intent
to impose retroactive liability also is supported
by CERCLA reauthorization in light of the
courts' consistent findings for retroactive
effect.
If Congress did not intend to establish retroactive liabil-
ity under CERCLA, it has had 16 years to amend the legisla-
tion and rectify the situation. There is no shortage of
evidence that the courts interpret CERCLA as retroactive; in-
deed, the leading CERCLA cases apply the traditional pre-
sumption against retroactive application of statutes revisited
in Landgraf and find for CERCLA retroactivity on the basis
that congressional intent in favor of such a result is mani-
festly clear. See NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 732; United States v.
Shell Oil Co., 605 F.Supp. 1064, 1069 (D. Colo. 1985); Ohio v.
Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp.1300, 1308-09 (N.D. Ohio 1983). Un-
less and until Congress addresses the issue of CERCLA's ret-
roactivity, there is no justifiable reason for overturning a
proposition that hundreds of PRPs have relied upon in set-
tling their CERCLA suits with other parties and the EPA.
While it is true that CERCLA liability has been criticized
by PRPs and other interested parties as harsh and broad,
such concerns are best addressed by Congress, and not by the
judicial body. Indeed, retroactive liability under CERCLA
has been hotly contested in recent congressional sessions.
The fact that Senator Oxley's proposed reform bill, H.R. 2500,
contains a repeal of retroactive liability suggests that Con-
gress believes the current liability scheme to be retroactive.
H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
(iv) Courts have declined to follow Olin's rejection of
CERCLA retroactivity in subsequent decisions.
Despite the evidence to the contrary, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Alabama recently
held that CERCLA does not apply to waste release sites ret-
roactively. Olin, 927 F. Supp. 1502. This decision not only
flies in the face of congressional intent but also stands alone
in the midst of a plethora of cases deciding otherwise. Olin is
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the sole authority GUVS can cite for its argument that it is
not liable for the costs of removing soil which it
contaminated.
In Davon, Inc. v. Shalala, 75 F.3d 1114, 1122 (7th Cir.
1996), the Seventh Circuit found that a retroactive financing
provision of the Coal Act of 1992 was not violative of the Due
Process Clause, nor was it an unconstitutional taking. In re-
jecting the plaintiffs' argument that retroactive legislation re-
quires a higher level of scrutiny, the Court stated that
"Supreme Court precedent could not be more contrary to
[plaintiffs'] position." Id. at 1122. Like the Coal Act at issue
in Davon, CERCLA is "a classic example of an economic regu-
lation - a legislative effort to structure and accommodate
'the burdens and benefits of economic life.'" Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 83 (1978)(quoting
Useryv. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
The test of due process required in assessing economically
retroactive legislation is that Congress "must have an in-
dependent rational basis for making a law retroactive." Da-
von, 75 F.3d at 1123. The Seventh Circuit not only was
aware of the Landgraf decision when it issued the Davon
opinion, it even cited to the opinion. Id. at 1122. Yet, the Sev-
enth Circuit saw no conflict between Landgraf and CERCLA,
noting in rejecting "degree of retroactivity" as a factor in a
due process inquiry that "[sluch a proposition would ignore
precedent upholding the unlimited retroactive reach of...
CERCLA." Id. at 1126. In the case at hand, the independent
rational basis for making CERCLA retroactive not only is
met, but also is indispensable to the meaning of the statute
itself. In order to remediate abandoned sites, Congress in-
tended for CERCLA to provide a mechanism allowing the im-
position of liability for cleanup on parties responsible for the
presence of the hazardous chemicals, regardless of past or
present ownership.
The Third Circuit rejected Olin and upheld the retroac-
tive effect of CERCLA in United States v. Alcan Corp., Civ.
No. 95-7570 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1996). Likewise, in Gould, Inc.
v. A&M Battery & Tire Serv., 933 F. Supp. 431, 437 (M.D. Pa.
1996), a Pennsylvania district court noted that Olin was "the
1997] 969
19
970 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
only Court to date to hold that CERCLA does not apply retro-
actively." That court held that "[a]ccordingly, we are unper-
suaded by a single Alabama District Court case which is
surrounded by a myriad of opinions that apply CERCLA ret-
roactively, either directly or implicitly. Thus, we will reject
Defendants' arguments on retroactivity grounds." Id. See also
Nevada v. U.S., No. CV-S-94-393-DWH (LRL) (D. Nev. 1996);
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Agway, Inc., No. 92-CV-0748 (N.D.N.Y.
1996).
Furthermore, it should be noted that Olin is not a done
deal - an appeal is pending that could very well turn over
that source of authority for GUVS.
B. Application of CERCLA to the Laurel Street release is
a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power
because GUVS' and SUPS' disposal activities
substantially affected interstate commerce.
It is difficult to comprehend how disposal of a commercial
by-product could not be economic activity. It is also difficult to
understand how one could rationally say that hazardous
waste disposal does not have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. But such is GUVS's position.
GUVS's argument fails to overcome the Lopez test for
federal Commerce Clause jurisdiction. See United States v.
Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995). Chemical dumping actually
satisfies the two prongs of the Lopez test, invoking federal
Commerce Clause jurisdiction. Id.
GUVS's reliance on the aforementioned decision in Olin
and the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe of Flor-
ida v. Florida,116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996), is also erroneous. The
Olin court tried to defer to Lopez but mischaracterized the
Lopez test. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. 1502. For this reason as
well as for those already enumerated, Olin has been widely
criticized. Seminole addresses the issue of whether or not
Congress may waive a state's right to immunity from suit by
its citizens. See Seminole, 116 S.Ct. 1114. That issue has
nothing to do with the case at hand.
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(i) Application of CERCLA to the Laurel Street
circumstances meets the Lopez test for federal
Commerce Clause jurisdiction.
Chief Justice Rehnquist based his majority opinion in Lo-
pez on two major issues: 1) Federal statutes must deal with
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce rather than merely regulating economic activity, and
2) They may not attempt to regulate an area of traditional
state authority. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624. In this case, GUVS
can claim neither factor. The release of hazardous sub-
stances at Laurel Street is an economic activity that substan-
tially affects interstate commerce, and it falls under
environmental law, which is traditionally a federal body of
law. Application of CERCLA to the Laurel Street cleanup is
fully within Congress' Commerce Clause power.
GUVS's dumping of photographic chemicals causes a
substantial impact on interstate commerce. Although New
Union Industrial Supply Corp. formulated the chemicals used
in the photography program and manufactured the equip-
ment used in the program, the corporation purchased the
materials for the chemicals and the equipment from vendors
nationwide. The fundamental components of the chemicals
dumped by GUYS undeniably crossed state lines, thus impli-
cating interstate commerce.
GUVS might argue that in Lopez the guns regulated by
§ 922(q) of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 also
crossed state lines before their ultimate sale. Id. at 1626.
Therefore, the fact that the components of the photographic
chemicals and equipment crossed state lines during manufac-
ture is meaningless. However, the Supreme Court's decision
in Lopez was that the act went beyond Congress' Commerce
Clause jurisdiction: The target of the act was not the commer-
cial result of the interstate shipments, the sale of guns; the
target was the social end-product - violence against school-
children. See id. By contrast, the activity sought to be regu-
lated by CERCLA in this case is commercial waste, not the
waste of human lives.
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In Lopez, the Supreme Court found that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act did not regulate economic activity, but
rather it cut down on criminal behavior. See id. Clearly, such
is. not the case with CERCLA. GUVS ran a business provid-
ing education to New Union citizens. Part of that business
involved the use and disposal of photographic chemicals for-
mulated from out-of-state components. "Where economic ac-
tivity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation
regulating that activity will be sustained." Id. at 1630. The
results of interstate transportation and subsequent disposal
of photographic chemicals fall within the regulatory power of
Congress under the Commerce Clause.
Even if GUVS' own dumping had only a de minimis effect
on interstate commerce, dumping is an economic activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce in the aggregate.
In Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-128 (1942), the
Supreme Court held that although one economic actor's activ-
ity may be too trivial to substantially affect interstate com-
merce, that activity may still be regulated by Congress if the
aggregate of such activity by other similarly situated eco-
nomic actors does substantially affect interstate commerce.
If businesses across the nation were free from federal
regulation of chemical dumping, the nation's groundwater
supply would be seriously jeopardized. As evidenced by
GUVS's and SUPS's behavior before the passage of CERCLA,
businesses are unlikely to take measures essential to the pro-
tection of our water supply without prodding by federal regu-
lation. In many ways that arguably are too obvious to
enumerate, interstate commerce depends on a safe water
supply. Safe water helps to ensure the health of workers.
Clean water helps ensure that industrial processes function
properly. Pollution regulations in general protect the envi-
ronment in which we live and the commercial centers from
which we produce.
One farmer's wheat consumption is said to substantially
affect interstate commerce in periods of price controls be-
cause the same activity by the aggregate of all farmers simi-
larly situated certainly has an impact on interstate
commerce. Id. at 127. One polluter's chemical dumping like-
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wise substantially affects interstate commerce because the
same behavior by the aggregate of all polluters similarly situ-
ated would have tremendous effects. As Congress may regu-
late the lone farmer, so may Congress regulate the lone
polluter.
The Supreme Court further expounded upon the aggre-
gation principle in Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981). In
Hodel, the Court said that a complex regulatory program can
survive a Commerce Clause challenge without a showing that
every facet is related to a valid congressional goal. Id. at 329
n. 17. As already established, regulation of the dumping by
GUVS is a valid congressional goal, but Hodel allows that
even if the goal were not valid, CERCLA, as a regulatory pro-
gram, is a constitutional exercise by Congress of its Com-
merce Clause authority.
As stated previously, Congress intended to remedy the
ravages of largely unregulated hazardous waste management
resulting from commercial activity nationwide. Numerous
courts have held that under such a rationale, CERCLA is a
legitimate exercise by Congress of its Commerce Clause juris-
diction. See Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692,
707-708 (D. Kan. 1991)(noting the abundance of congres-
sional findings concerning the pervasive effects of hazardous-
waste releases into the environment); Missouri v. Indep. Pe-
trochem. Corp., 13 Chem. Waste Lit. Rep. 463 (E.D. Mo.
1986).
In addition, the court should keep in mind that federal
regulations enacted under the Commerce Clause are subject
to rational-basis review. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 329 (1981).
Therefore, a court must give substantial deference to Con-
gress's determination that a regulation falls within its Com-
merce Clause power. In light of the substantial rational basis
for CERCLA, the Twelfth Circuit should uphold CERCLA as
a legitimate regulatory scheme and application of CERCLA
to GUVS as an aspect of that scheme.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's second test factor focused on
the intrusion into an area traditionally regulated by the
states. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-1631. In Lopez, that area
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was criminal law, but unlike criminal law, environmental law
is not clearly an area of traditional state regulation.
Although there were few federal pollution statutes before
1970, there also were not many state pollution statutes. John
P. Dwyer, The Commerce Clause and the Limits of Congres-
sional Authority to Regulate the Environment, 25 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10408 (1995). After 1970, though, fed-
eral regulation of the environment proliferated. "As a practi-
cal matter, it is too late in 1995 to claim that federal
environmental legislation . . .improperly intrudes on state
authority .... Federal environmental law has become too
deeply imbedded in our legal, political, and economic culture
for the Court to repeal it wholesale under the Commerce
Clause." Id.
GUVS therefore cannot persuasively argue that environ-
mental law is a traditional area of state authority. In fact,
GUVS might have more success arguing that CERCLA, as
applied to this case, implicates educational law and therefore
unconstitutionally treads into state authority, but this argu-
ment fails also. GUVS's educational orientation is irrelevant
to the 123 Laurel Street cleanup. Although GUVS used the
photographic chemicals as a teaching tool, its successor SUPS
engaged in the same dumping practice for the same result.
CERCLA applies because of the commercial implications of
GUVS' dumping of photographic chemicals. Whereas the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 clearly was enacted with
education in mind, CERCLA has nothing to do with educa-
tion. CERCLA is a pollution-control law, plain and simple.
(ii) The Olin court misread Lopez and misinterpreted
the test set forth in that case.
With all due respect to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Alabama, Senior District Judge Hand
misstepped when he explained what he viewed to be the test
in Lopez: "Lopez requires 1) that the statute itself regulate
economic activity, which activity 'substantially affects' inter-
state commerce ... and 2) that the statute include a 'jurisdic-
tional element' which would ensure, through a case-by-case
inquiry, that the [statute] in question affects interstate com-
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merce." Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1532. With regard to the first
element, Judge Hand hit the nail on the head. On the second
element, however, the honorable judge misfired.
The Supreme Court in Lopez noted that "§ 922(q) has no
express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to
a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an
explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce," but
only after first concluding that the Gun-Free School Zones
Act did not on its face implicate an economic activity that had
a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Lopez, 115 S.Ct.
at 1631. The gist was that a jurisdictional element would be
required only if a general substantial effect on interstate com-
merce could not be found. Id.
"We agree with the government that Congress normally is
not required to make formal findings as to the substantial
burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce." Id.
Because a statute need not include a jurisdictional ele-
ment if it clearly applies to an economic activity that substan-
tially affects interstate commerce, Olin is a flimsy foundation
on which to build a case. GUVS's reliance on Olin empha-
sizes the weakness of its assertion that application of CER-
CLA to the case at hand is unconstitutional.
Reliance on Olin is further devalued by the widespread
criticism that the opinion has received. In addition to the
courts that refuse to apply Olin's CERCLA retroactivity hold-
ing, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District Illinois
refused to apply Olin's Commerce Clause jurisdiction reason-
ing. United States v. NL Indus. Inc., No. 91-CV-578-JLF (S.D.
Ill. 1996). "Lopez does not require that a statute contain a 'ju-
risdictional element' which would ensure, through a case-by-
case inquiry, that the statute affects interstate commerce,"
the court said. Id.
Democratic staff members of the House Commerce Com-
mittee have also criticized Olin, noting that Judge Hand's de-
cision deeming CERCLA to be nonretroactive and in violation
of the Commerce Clause is alone among federal court deci-
sions. 9 No. 6 Mealey's Litig. Rep.: Superfund 4 (June 1996).
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(iii) Seminole does not dispose of WUWPS's claim
against GUVS because the material issue in
Seminole differs from that in the case at
hand.
GUVS's reliance on Seminole is a bit bewildering. In
Seminole, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Congress does
not have the authority to waive a state's right to be free from
citizen suit under the 11th Amendment of the Constitution.
Seminole, 116 S.Ct. 1114. Apparently, GUVS is trying to
claim that it is a state agency, but its current administration
does not qualify it to be a state agency.
Presumably, GUVS's argument goes something like this:
The state legislature incorporated GUVS by a special act of
legislation and allocated $1 million to start the school, which
took the place of the traditional state college. Thus GUVS
believes that it more or less amounts to a state agency, mak-
ing a lawsuit against it equivalent to one against the state of
New Union.
Nice try, but in a 1964 opinion, the New Union Attorney
General said that "GUVS is not an instrumentality of the
New Union state government." (R. at 4). In addition, not only
has GUVS never received any additional funds from the state
of New Union beyond the initial $1 million, but it received a
bequest of $3 million from local rancher Mollie Peterson in
1972 and used the money to build state-of-the-art facilities at
its current location without any guidance from the state. (R.
at 5).
GUVS is not a state agency. It is not an instrumentality
of the government. And as an independent institution, it has
accepted a substantial amount of financial support from the
private sector. It is difficult to fathom how suing GUVS could
be equivalent to suing the state of New Union, but such a
stretch would be necessary if any credence were to be given to
GUVS's reliance on Seminole.
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY
CONCLUDED THAT WUWPS HAS THE
CHOICE OF SEEKING COST RECOVERY,
INCLUDING EXPENSES FOR THE
ORPHAN SHARE OF CLEANUP COSTS, FROM
GUVS UNDER CERCLA 107, BUT DOING SO
DOES NOT EXPOSE WUWPS TO LIABILITY
FOR MEDICAL COSTS.
CERCLA's private liability provisions are facially so un-
clear that even when it is apparent that CERCLA is applica-
ble to a hazardous waste release, the allocation of liability
among parties is often disputed. GUVS appeals the district
court's holding that WUWPS may elect to proceed against it
under either of CERCLA's two private liability provisions.
Careful analysis of the statute reveals that the district court
correctly interpreted CERCLA in that holding. However, the
court also held that CERCLA allows recovery for costs of
medical monitoring programs amounting to personal injury
treatment and prevention. On that issue, the district court
incorrectly interpreted CERCLA's liability provisions.
A. The court below properly ruled that WUWPS could
proceed under either CERCLA 107 for compensation
of cleanup costs or CERCLA 113 for contribution
to cleanup costs.
Congress added section 113 to CERCLA in 1986 without
indicating whether the new legislation should supplement or
preclude section 107 actions. A number of courts have held
that private parties who are themselves PRPs may not re-
cover under section 107, but are limited to section 113's con-
tribution provision. United States v. Colorado & Eastern R.R.
Co., 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995); United Technologies Corp.
v. Browning Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1994),
cert. denied,115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v.
Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994). Many of these
opinions were result-oriented, however, and were crafted to
protect settling parties or parties who would be harmed by
the statute of limitations differences between the two provi-
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sions. Neither of those concerns is present in the case at
hand.
(i) CERCLA 113 merely provides an alternative cause
of action for cost recovery.
Theoretically, whether an action is brought under 107 or
113 should make no substantive difference, merely a proce-
dural one. Steven F. Baicker-McKee and James M. Singer,
Narrowing the Roads of Private Cost Recovery: Recent Devel-
opments Limiting the Recovery of Pirvate Response Costs
Under CERCLA 107,25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10593,
10595 (Nov. 1995). Realistically, however, courts have come
to interpret the two sections to provide different scopes of lia-
bility. Section 113 allocates liability using "equitable fac-
tors," which, some courts maintain, leave plaintiffs
responsible for "orphan shares," the costs attributable to
judgment-proof parties. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). CERCLA
107 authorizes a cause of action to recover costs of removal,
remediation, and other necessary costs consistent with the
National Contingency Plan. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D).
GUVS asserts that WUWPS, as a PRP, is limited to contribu-
tion under section 113, and that GUVS therefore is not liable
for the orphan share of costs allocable to the bankrupt SUPS.
Most courts do not share GUVS's construction of CER-
CLA. An extensive and growing body of case law confers sec-
tion 107 standing on parties who incur response costs
regardless of their own potential liability. See Alcan Alumi-
num Corp., 964 F.2d at 261; Adhesives Research, Inc. v. Am.
Inks & Coatings Corp., 931 F. Supp. 1231, 1238 (M.D. Pa.
1996). Many courts allow PRPs to pursue claims under
either section, viewing 113 as a clarification to 107, an inter-
pretation of the CERCLA liability scheme strongly supported
by the only Supreme Court opinion to address CERCLA lia-
bility allocation. See Key Tronic Corp. v.U.S., 511 U.S. 809
(1994).
It is also important to note how section 113 complements
section 107. "[Slection 113(f) ... expressly recognizes a right
of contribution. [It] does not create the right of contribution
- rather the source of a contribution claim is section 107(a).
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Under CERCLA's scheme, section 107 governs liability, while
section 113(f) creates a mechanism for apportioning that lia-
bility among responsible parties." United States v. ASARCO,
Inc., 814 F. Supp. 951, 956 (D. Colo. 1993) (citations omitted).
As an addendum to 107, therefore, section 113 should not
preclude actions taken under 107 by most PRPs, but rather
should supplement 107 with an alternative cause of action.
(ii) Section 113 encourages early settlements and
protects settling parties from future claims by
holdout parties.
In addressing CERCLA liability allocation, courts should
keep in mind Congress's intent that toxic waste sites be cle-
aned up expeditiously and fairly. ASARCO, 814 F. Supp. at
956. Section 113 serves this purpose by encouraging parties
to settle quickly and avoid costly litigation expenses that eat
up money that could otherwise be used for cleanup. In sec-
tion 113(f)(2), CERCLA provides contribution protection to
those who have already settled out of a dispute, forbidding
remaining litigants from suing settling parties for contribu-
tion over and above the amounts already paid in settlement.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
As such, 113 does not really even apply to the circum-
stances of the case before this court. WUWPS undertook to
clean up the contamination immediately upon notification of
the threat it posed to the Marina family. Nobody had an op-
portunity to settle before or during the cleanup. Here there is
no fear that litigation expenses will consume resources that
could otherwise be used in CERCLA response activities be-
cause everything that needs to be cleaned up has been cle-
aned up.
It makes sense that WUWPS should have its choice of
sections under which to seek recovery from other responsible
parties. Forcing WUWPS to invoke section 113 as its author-
ity for this claim penalizes WUWPS for providing prompt and
responsible action.
Restricting PRPs to section 113 contribution claims actu-
ally hurts parties who have taken on the responsibility of re-
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sponding to hazardous substance releases without a thought
as to what their own ultimate liabilities are. Should such a
PRP encounter a court that unfairly construes the equitable
factors of liability allocation required by section 113, it could
be saddled with shares of the response costs attributable to
judgment-proof parties. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). Smart PRPs
would refrain from taking action, then, to avoid being stuck
with the bills.
(iii) Administrative reforms and recent case law
support the choice-of-law theory.
The Environmental Protection Agency appears to have
taken this and other issues into consideration, announcing
several "common sense" administrative reforms in October of
1995. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency news release,
Oct 2, 1995. Using these guidelines, orphan share issues may
be resolved before ever even getting to the contribution
phase. In looking to these guidelines, GUVS is liable for
remediation costs due to SUPS's conduct as well as its own.
Recently, the Middle District of Pennsylvania allowed a
PRP who had settled with the government to bring a section
107 action against nonsettling PRPs. Adhesives Research,
Inc., 931 F. Supp. 1231. The court asserted that only nonset-
thing parties should be limited to section 113 claims for
contribution.
Using this analysis, WUWPS is entitled to seek recovery
under section 107, and GUVS cannot escape liability for
SUPS's share of the cleanup costs. Although the EPA and
New Union did not become involved in the site remediation,
WUWPS's position is analogous to that of a settling party
who has performed cleanup in accordance with a consent de-
cree or agreement with the government. WUWPS voluntarily
cleaned up a waste hazard to which it in no way contributed.
Like a settling party, WUWPS did not attempt to stall or
avoid costs by litigating before cleanup and forcing a time-
consuming and expensive court proceeding, but rather, ad-
dressed the problem in an efficient and responsible manner.
To reward WUWPS for its prompt attention by restricting it
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to a contribution claim would not only contradict the statu-
tory scheme, it would be inequitable.
By the same token, GUVS takes a position comparable to
that of the nonsettling party. In a situation where there is no
settlement or consent decree with the government, the analy-
sis should logically be that those PRPs who resist liability are
the PRPs who are limited to section 113 actions, and are
therefore the PRPs who will assume the orphan share costs.
(iv) In the alternative, even if WUWPS were to be
limited to contribution under CERCLA 113,
GUVS would still be liable for SUPS's
"orphan share" of cleanup cost.
Even if section 113 were to preclude WUWPS from pro-
ceeding under section 107, GUVS still would not escape or-
phan share liability. According to the Fifth Circuit, a court
has considerable latitude under section 113 to determine
each party's equitable share of response costs. Amoco Oil Co.
v. Borden, Inc.,889 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1989).
The Fifth Circuit turned to a failed amendment for gui-
dance in suggesting possible relevant factors. Id. The "Gore
Factors,"as they are commonly known, would have provided
courts with the discretion to apportion damages even in cases
where a PRP is unable to demonstrate its contribution to the
environmental damage. The factors would also have consid-
ered the different parties' degrees of participation in the haz-
ardous waste releases and degrees of cooperation with
government officials to prevent harm to the public health or
environment. 126 Cong. Rec. 30,909 (1980). Under this anal-
ysis, a court could even apportion SUPS's orphan share en-
tirely to GUVS in light of GUVS's responsibility for the
chemical dumping at 123 Laurel Street.
Other courts have also held that their broad powers of
equity allow them to allocate orphan shares among any viable
parties even when restricting PRPs to section 113 actions.
According to the District Court for the Southern District of
New York, "Courts can use the powers provided by Sec. 113(f)
to allocate any 'orphan shares' among viable PRPs, with the
1997]
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result that each viable PRP's allocable share may include a
portion of whatever 'orphan shares' there are." Town of New
Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 662, 681 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
B. CERCLA does not provide a cause of action for the
recovery of the costs of the Marinas' medical
monitoring regime because it is a protocol for
personal injury treatment or prevention.
The district court's award of medical monitoring costs to
SNUHSA is erroneous because CERCLA does not provide a
cause of action for personal injury or disease damages. The
Marinas' medical monitoring program falls outside the scope
of the health studies programs authorized by CERCLA.
(i) CERCLA only authorizes causes of action for the
recovery of response costs, not for the recovery of
personal injury or economic loss damages.
CERCLA section 107 establishes a cause of action for re-
covery of costs incurred in responding to a toxic release. The
section does not specifically address the issue of medical mon-
itoring, however, so the court must turn to statutory con-
struction to determine whether or not CERCLA allows for
recovery of medical monitoring costs.
Section 107 allows private recovery for four categories of
damages: the costs of removal and remedial action incurred
by government agencies; necessary costs of response incurred
by private parties; damages to natural resources; and the
costs of health assessments and health effects studies per-
formed as authorized by CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-
(D). Because SNUHSA is a government entity, the court
need not consider the issue of costs necessarily incurred by
private parties, and because SNUHSA's issue does not in-
volve damage to natural resources, the court can automati-
cally rule that category out of consideration. The other
categories require further consideration.
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(a) The Marina family's medical monitoring
program is not a removal or remedial
action.
SNUHSA is suing for recovery of medical monitoring
costs. SNUHSA is the state of New Union's public health
department, a state government entity that qualifies under
CERCLA 107(a)(4)(A). (R. at 6). If SNUHSA can allege that
the medical monitoring costs are "costs of removal or reme-
dial action incurred [by it] not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan," then the district court's ruling on the issue
is correct. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
SNUHSA cannot do so. The parties have stipulated that
the Marina family's medical monitoring program is not incon-
sistent with the national contingency plan, but the costs of
the program do not fall within the scope of "removal or reme-
dial action," as required for recovery. "Removal" is "the
cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from
the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23). "Remedial action[s]"
are "those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken
instead of or in addition to removal actions ... to prevent or
minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do
not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future
public health or welfare or the environment." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(24).
Both definitions focus on the hazardous substances that
have been released. They do not consider the people who
have already suffered exposure. This is because CERCLA is
a response mechanism, geared toward containing and
preventing further damage.
Both definitions list a series of authorized response activ-
ities. "Removal" includes installation of security fencing, lim-
itation of access to the site, and temporary evacuation and
housing for individuals at risk of exposure. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(23). For both removal and remedial action, all exam-
ples are containment procedures or methods of assessing the
spread of the released substances.
Courts interpreting CERCLA should use these examples
as guidelines to determine what Congress intended.
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Although the code states that the removal and remedial ac-
tions are not limited to activities listed in the examples, the
examples show what type of activities are authorized. See
Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1247 (M.D. Pa.
1990) (citing Coburn v. Sun Chem. Corp., 28 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1590, 1988 WL 120739 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (discussing
ejusdem generis analysis)). This method of analysis is known
as ejusdem generis, meaning "of the same kind." Use of it
allows a simple conclusion that Congress meant to focus on
preventing the spread of the chemicals that have been re-
leased and not on the development of ailments in people who
have already been exposed.
For medical monitoring costs to qualify under section
107, the monitoring must go toward the removal or remedial
action undertaken to counteract the release of hazardous sub-
stances. See Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn.
1988). To so qualify, the purpose of the medical monitoring
must be to assess the extent of the release or to gather epide-
miological data about the characteristics of the hazardous
substances.
The Marinas' medical monitoring does not fulfill such a
purpose. The monitoring consists of examination of "each
member of the family ... for sign of adverse effects from hav-
ing consumed the contaminated water." (R. at 7). The small
scope of contamination and exposure precludes the possibility
that this medical monitoring program is for the prevention of
further exposure. The full extent of the contamination is
known. The parties have stipulated that WUWPS has fully
remediated the site, thereby negating the possibility of fur-
ther contamination or exposure.
There remains the argument that the Marinas' medical
monitoring program does prevent future danger to public
health and welfare because the health of the Marinas quali-
fies as such. Most courts dismiss this argument as too far a
stretch, however. In particular, the court in Werlein v. U.S.,
746 F. Supp. 887, 904 (D. Minn. 1990), disposed of that
argument:
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It is true that medical monitoring could mitigate the ad-
verse public health effects of the release. However, it is
equally true that removing a cancerous tumor from a vic-
tim would also mitigate the adverse public health effects in
the same manner. Examining the tumor prior to surgery
would certainly be an "assessment" of the effect of [the
toxin] on the victim. Yet it is clear that the mitigation and
assessment described above are medical procedures for the
treatment of injury, the costs of which are not recoverable
as response costs.
The Marinas' medical monitoring program is such a proce-
dure. SNUHSA cannot recover the costs for it under CER-
CLA 107.
(b) The Marinas' medical monitoring program is
not a health assessment or health effects
study.
CERCLA 107(a)(4)(D) provides for recovery of health as-
sessment and health effects study expenses authorized by
CERCLA 104(i). 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(D). This would seem
fertile ground for SNUHSA's claim, but the Marinas' program
does not fall within its scope.
Section 104(i) sets up a three-tiered system of health
studies for toxic releases. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i). Progression
through the three stages is supervised by the local adminis-
trator of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Regis-
try (ATSDR), an agency within the Public Health Service.
Because the ATSDR administrator must order or approve
each progression through 104(i)'s layers of health studies,
courts have concluded that "[o]nly governmental entities may
recover the cost of medical monitoring, as performed" by the
ATSDR. Murray v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 867 F. Supp. 33,
47 (D. Maine 1994)(citing Daigle v. ShellOil Co., 972 F.2d
1527 (10th Cir. 1992)). SNUHSA could sue for cost recovery
under this section if it can allege that the medical monitoring
costs are proper under section 107, but it cannot do so.
The three levels of health studies called for by CERCLA
104(i) are health assessment, health effects studies, and
health surveillance programs. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(6),(7),(9).
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Note that section 107(a)(4)(D) only authorizes the recovery of
the costs for health assessments and health effects studies.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(D).
Health assessments are "preliminary assessments of the
potential risk to human health posed by individual sites and
facilities" and consist of toxicology reviews and evaluation of
emissions pathways. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(6)(F). Local ATSDR
administrators must perform these assessments at sites
listed on the national priorities list and upon the request of
individuals or physicians. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(6)(A),(B). If the
ATSDR administrator determines that there has been an ap-
preciable release, he may authorize a health effects study,
which includes epidemiological testing and other studies of
the dangers posed to exposed human populations. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(i)(7)(B). If those studies show a significant risk of ad-
verse health effects in humans, then the administrator finally
may call for a health surveillance program, including medical
monitoring of the type ordered for the Marinas: periodic med-
ical testing, screening for disease, and treatment referral. 42
U.S.C. § 9604(i)(9).
This system uses medical assessment and surveillance to
determine the extent of release and to formulate response ac-
tions to prevent future release and exposure from the same
site. Only in emergencies may the ATSDR administrator au-
thorize continued medical monitoring for victims of exposure,
since doing so is considered treatment for injury. "[I]n cases
of public health emergencies caused... by exposure to toxic
substances, [the administrator shall] provide medical care
and testing to exposed individuals, including but not limited
to tissue sampling, chromosomal testing where appropriate,
epidemiological studies, or any other assistance appropriate
under the circumstances." 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(1)(D).
The Marinas' exposure to the photographic chemicals is
hardly a continuing public health emergency. The contami-
nation was limited to the seven family members, and the
source of the exposure has been removed. Furthermore,
there is no evidence that SNUHSA's examination of the situ-
ation progressed in the fashion outlined in CERCLA. (R. at 6-
7). SNUHSA skipped CERCLA 104(i)'s first two steps and
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automatically ordered the medical monitoring program. Be-
sides, medical monitoring fall under the category of health
surveillance programs, the costs of which are not recoverable
under CERCLA 107. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(D).
(ii) Courts distinguish between CERCLA-authorized
medical monitoring and medical monitoring for
personal health, denying recovery for the
latter under CERCLA.
Sometimes it is necessary to monitor local populations
for exposure effects to determine the extent and severity of a
release. Such medical monitoring costs are necessary re-
sponse costs under CERCLA and consistent with the Na-
tional Contingency Plan. See 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1995). They
are recoverable under CERCLA 107(a). Other medical moni-
toring programs do not qualify.
There are two lines of cases that address medical moni-
toring costs under CERCLA: those following Brewer v.
Ravan, 680 F. Supp.1176, holding that medical monitoring
costs are recoverable under CERCLA because they address a
necessary response to hazardous substance releases; and
those following Coburn, 28Env'tRep. Cas. (BNA) 1668, re-
jecting any contention that medical testing and monitoring
can serve as a remedial measure and thus be "necessary costs
of response" under section 107.
The Brewer cases evolve by noting that not all medical
monitoring costs address CERCLA-authorized response to
the same degree. Lykins v. Westinghouse Elec., 27 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1590, 1988 WL 114522 (E.D. Ky. 1988), pointed
out that medical monitoring costs are recoverable if they are
part of a cleanup. Meanwhile, the Coburn cases in the soften
away from Coburn'sharsh rule: the court in Williams v. Allied
Automotive, Autolite Division, 704 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio
1988), held that medical monitoring costs are not categori-
cally unrecoverable under CERCLA. Williams stated that if
costs are necessary under and consistent with the National
Contingency Plan, they may be recoverable. Id. at 784.
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The two lines of cases merged in Cook v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468 (D. Colo. 1991), in which the Colo-
rado court decided that medical monitoring may be bifurcated
into monitoring for personal health and monitoring for deter-
mination of the status and extent of toxic release and contam-
ination. Expenses for the former are not recoverable under
CERCLA, but the latter are. Id. at 1474. This merger was
cemented by the Tenth Circuit's decision in Daigle v. Shell
Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, in which the circuit court reviewed
CERCLA recommendations for monitoring programs and
found that the authorized programs relate "only to an evalua-
tion of the extent of a 'release or threat of release of hazard-
ous substances'" and consist of actions necessary to "prevent
or mitigate damage to public health by preventing contact be-
tween the spreading contaminants and the public."
The Daigle court denied the plaintiffs' request for long-
term health monitoring costs "to assist plaintiffs and class
members in the prevention or early detection and treatment
of chronic disease" because such monitoring "clearly has
nothing to do with preventing contact between a 'release or
threatened release' and the public. The release has already
occurred." Id. The Marinas' medical monitoring program
likewise has nothing to do with preventing contact between a
release and the public. The release has already been cleaned
up, the extent of the exposure already determined, the future
threat from GUVS's and SUPS's drainage of photographic
chemicals into the backyard ditch at 123 Laurel Street dis-
pelled. The Marinas' monitoring may not therefore spawn a
claim for recovery under CERCLA. See Werlein, 746 F. Supp.
at 904.
(iii) Congress did not intend to create a cause of
action for personal injury under CERCLA.
A look at the evolution of CERCLA in both Congressional
houses easily reveals what Congress intended to do with
CERCLA.
The House bill originally authorized a cause of action for
the recovery of "all damages for personal injury, injury to real
or personal property, and economic loss, resulting from re-
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lease." H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in
Superfund: A Legislative History, (Envt'l L. Inst.) (1982), at
Vol. III, 183. The bill that the House enacted six months
later did not contain this provision. Id. Its deletion did not go
unnoticed: several members of the House remarked on its ab-
sence, including Representative Gore, who bemoaned the
"drastic whittling down of the original liability provisions."
H.R. Rep. No. 016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 62-65 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6139-41. Such remarks
show that Congress engaged in a complete discussion about
the deletion and purposefully intended for personal injury
and economic loss provisions to be excised from the bill.
The original Senate bill likewise authorized a private
cause of action for the recovery of "out-of-pocket medical ex-
penses, including rehabilitation costs or burial expenses, due
to personal injury." S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), re-
printed in Superfund: A Legislative History at Vol. I, 289.
This provision as also rejected, and the House's edited ver-
sion was adopted by the Senate as a compromise bill. The
compromise bill's cosponsor, Senator Randolph, specifically
pointed out that "we have deleted the Federal cause of action
for medical expenses or income loss." 126 Cong. Rec. 14,964
(1980), reprinted in Superfund: A Legislative History at Vol.
II, 260. Senators Mitchell and Williams, among others, criti-
cized the loss of compensation for personal injury. 126 Cong.
Rec. 30,941, 30,970 (1980).
However, "Congress did not intend to make injured par-
ties whole or to create a general vehicle for toxic tort actions."
Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1238. "[A] statute should be con-
strued in harmony with the sphere of legal remedies avail-
able[.] Congress surely did not intend to create an overlap
between traditional state tort claims and a 'new' CERCLA
federal toxic tort action." Id. at 1250. Doing so would have
further confused the already chaotic world of toxic tort litiga-
tion. See In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., 168 F.R.D.
203 (S.D. Ohio 1996)(listing traditional tort requirements for
medical monitoring damages in each of the fifty states).
Since a "request for medical monitoring to allow 'preven-
tion or early detection and treatment of chronic disease'
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smacks of a cause of action for damages resulting from per-
sonal injury," the Daigle court denied medical monitoring
costs to the plaintiffs. 972 F.2d at 1535. SNUHSA's claim for
the costs of the Marinas' quarterly medical monitoring "for
sign of adverse effects from having consumed the contami-
nated water" also smacks of a cause of action for damages
resulting from personal injury. Considering Congress's in-
tentional omission of medical expenses from CERCLA's re-
covery provisions and considering the potentially confusing
overlap with state toxic tort law, SNUHSA cannot invoke
CERCLA to recover the costs of the medical monitoring pro-
gram from WUWPS. The district court erred in allowing
SNUHSA to do so.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request that
this Court uphold the United States District Court for the
District of New Union's ruling on applicability of CERCLA,
uphold the ruling on choice of law between CERCLA 107 and
CERCLA 113, and overrule the decision to allow recovery for
medical monitoring costs under CERCLA. Neither GUVS nor
SNUHSA has asserted a genuine issue for trial. WUWPS is
therefore entitled to summary judgment on all issues.
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APPENDIX
Statutory Provisions
Section 101(23) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. provides
in pertinent part:
The terms "remove" and "removal" means the cleanup or
removal of released hazardous substances from the envi-
ronment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the
event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into
the environment, such actions as may be necessary to mon-
itor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of
hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or
the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to
prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health
or welfare of to the environment, which may otherwise re-
sult from a release or threat of release. The term includes,
in addition, without being limited to, security fencing or
other measures to limit access, provision of alternative
water supplies, temporary evacuation and housing of
threatened individuals not otherwise provided for...
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23).
Section 101(24) of CERCLA provides in pertinent part:
The terms "remedy" or "remedial action" means those ac-
tions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of
or in addition to removal actions in the event of a release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance into the envi-
ronment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous
substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial
danger to present or future public health or welfare or the
environment. The term includes, but is not limited to,
such actions at the location of the release as storage, con-
finement, perimeter protection using dikes, trenches, or
ditches, clay cover, neutralization, cleanup of released haz-
ardous substances and associated contaminated materials,
recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction, segregation of re-
active wastes, dredging or excavations, repair or replace-
ment of leaking containers, collection of leachate and
runoff, onsite treatment or incineration, provision of alter-
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native water supplies, and any monitoring reasonably re-
quired to assure that such actions protect the public health
and welfare and the environment."
42 U.S.C. § 101(24).
Section 104(i) of CERCLA provides in pertinent part the
following:
(1) There is hereby established within the Public Health
Service an agency, to be known as the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry, which shall ... effectu-
ate and implement the health related authorities of this
chapter.
In addition, said Administrator shall -
(D) in cases of public health emergencies caused or be-
lieved to be caused by exposure to toxic substances, provide
medical care and testing to exposed individuals, including
but not limited to tissue sampling, chromosomal testing
where appropriate, epidemiological studies, or any other
assistance appropriate under the circumstances...
(6)(B) The Administrator of ATSDR may perform health
assessments for releases or facilities where individual per-
sons or licensed physicians provide information that indi-
viduals have been exposed to a hazardous substance, for
which the probable source of such exposure is a release.
(F) For the purposes of this subsection ... the term "health
assessments" shall include preliminary assessments of the
potential risk to human health posed by individual sites
and facilities, based on such factors as the nature and ex-
tent of contamination, the existence of potential pathways
of human exposure (including ground or surface water con-
tamination, air emissions, and food chain contamination),
the size and potential susceptibility of the community
within the likely pathways of exposure, the comparison of
expected human exposure levels to the short-term and
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long-term health effects associated with identified hazard-
ous substances and any available recommended exposure
or tolerance limits for such hazardous substances, and the
comparison of existing morbidity and mortality data on
diseases that may be associated with the observed levels of
exposure.
(7)(A) Whenever in the judgment of the Administrator of
ATSDR it is appropriate on the basis of the results of a
health assessment, the Administrator of ATSDR shall con-
duct a pilot study of health effects for selected groups of
exposed individuals in order to determine the desirability
of conducting full scale epidemiological or other health
studies of the entire exposed population.
(B) Whenever in the judgment of the Administrator of
ATSDR it is appropriate on the basis of the results of such
pilot study.., the Administrator of ATSDR shall conduct
such full scale epidemiological or other health studies as
may be necessary to determine the health effects on the
population exposed to hazardous substances from a release
or threatened release.
(9) Where the Administrator of ATSDR has determined
that there is a significant increased risk of adverse health
effects in humans from exposure to hazardous substances
based on the results of a health assessment... [or] an epi-
demiological study... the Administrator of ATSDR shall
initiate a health surveillance program for such population.
This program shall include but not be limited to -
(A) periodic medical testing where appropriate of popula-
tions subgroups to screen for diseases for which the popu-
lation or subgroup is at significant increased risk; and
(B) a mechanism to refer for treatment those individuals
within such population who are screened positive for such
diseases.
42 U.S.C. § 104(i).
In pertinent part, section 107 of CERCLA provides that
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"(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility [or]
(2)any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance owned or operated any facility at which such
hazardous substances were disposed of... shall be liable
for - (A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred
by the ... [g]overnment ... not inconsistent with the na-
tional contingency plan; (B) any other necessary costs or
response incurred by any other person consistent with the
national contingency plan; (C) damages for injury to ...
natural resources ... ; and (D) the costs of any health as-
sessment or health effects study carried out under section
9604(i) of this title."
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
In pertinent part, section 113(f) of CERCLA provides
that "Any person may seek contribution from any other per-
son who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of
this title. . ." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f).
44http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/15
